Abstract-The major disadvantage of existing watermarking methods is their limited resistance to extensive geometric attacks. In addition, we have found that the weakness of multiple watermark embedding methods that were initially designed to resist geometric attacks is their inability to withstand the watermarkestimation attacks (WEAs), leading to reduce resistance to geometric attacks. In view of these facts, this paper proposes a robust image watermarking scheme that can withstand geometric distortions and WEAs simultaneously. Our scheme is mainly composed of three components: 1) robust mesh generation and mesh-based watermarking to resist geometric distortions; 2) construction of media hash-based content-dependent watermark to resist WEAs; and 3) a mechanism of false positive-oriented watermark detection, which can be used to determine the existence of a watermark so as to achieve a tradeoff between correct detection and false detection. Furthermore, extensive experimental results obtained using the standard benchmark (i.e., Stirmark) and WEAs, and comparisons with relevant watermarking methods confirm the excellent performance of our method in improving robustness. To our knowledge, such a thorough evaluation has not been reported in the literature before.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
IGITAL watermarking has been recognized as a helpful technology for copyright protection, traitor tracing, and authentication. No matter which kinds of applications are considered, robustness is a critical issue affecting the practicability of the watermarking system. Robustness refers to the capability of resistance to attacks that are used to destroy or remove hidden watermarks. In general, attacks were divided into four categories [36] : 1) removal attacks; 2) geometric attacks; 3) cryptographic attacks; and 4) protocol attacks. Among them, geometric attacks introduce synchronization errors in order to disable watermark detection without having to remove hidden information or degrade the quality of the watermarked contents. On the other hand, there exist watermark-estimation attacks (WEAs), including the collusion attack that can remove watermarks while making the attacked data further transparent to its original, and the copy attack that can cause protocol ambiguity within a watermarking system. Motivated by the need for sufficient robustness, this study focused on the challenging problem of resisting both (extensive) geometric attacks and WEAs, which has not been solved in the literature. Clearly, this ambitious goal distinguishes our work and existing methods. The existing watermarking methods that are resistant to geometric attacks can be divided into three categories. The first category includes those which embed a watermark into the geometric invariant domain. In [14] , [23] , and [37] , watermarking was conducted in the magnitude part of the Fourier-Mellin transform (FMT) to exploit its affine invariance. However, the Fourier-Mellin domain is inherently vulnerable to cropping and other local geometric distortions (e.g., changes of the aspect ratio). In addition, resistance to removal attacks is limited because most of the FMT information is contained in the phase instead of the magnitude part of the Fourier transformed domain. In [31] , the watermark itself is designed to be circularly symmetric and is embedded in the Fourier transform magnitudes corresponding to a predefined set of mid-frequency coefficients. On the other hand, moment normalization [1] , [17] Radon transformations [30] , or Zernike moments [10] were employed to achieve geometric invariance. Their major limitation is the inability to resist attacks related to cropping because the lost contents lead to changes of moments.
The methods belonging to the second category use a template [24] , [25] , [32] or insert a periodic watermark pattern [12] , [35] for the purpose of resynchronization. This kind of prior information is also known as the pilot signal [20] . In [24] and [25] , templates were embedded in the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) domain to generate the shape of local peaks, which can be easily retrieved in the detection process to recover geometric parameters. On the other hand, the local peaks can also be easily extracted by pirates in order to remove templates [9] . In [12] , Kutter was first to propose a watermarking scheme that 1520-9210/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE can provide resistance to global geometrical distortions. The key step in this method is the embedding of a self-reference watermark, which is prepared in advance as a specific structural pattern, for the purpose of calibration. The main drawback is that the adopted global watermark structure can be totally destroyed by means of local geometric distortions. A more powerful approach [35] extends Kutter's scheme through blockbased periodical placement of self-reference watermarks so that the Fourier magnitude spectrum of periodical watermarks is composed of regular peaks distributed all over the image. This particular feature, i.e., a lattice of peaks, provides the capability of recovering global/local geometrical distortions. Again, because the positioned periodical block-based pilot signals inherently reveal peaks in the transformed domain, hints remain that a watermark estimation attack (e.g., the collusion attack) can be used to efficiently destroy them [15] .
The third category includes methods [2] , [13] , [22] , [29] , [33] which employ "feature-based watermarking." Feature points detected in the original image are used to form local regions for embedding. At the detection end, the feature points are expected to be robustly detected. Among the existing feature point extraction methods, the Harris detector [5] is widely used in various applications. However, we have found that the Harris detector is still not robust enough to be used in digital watermarking [2] . This is because the Harris detector is rotation and scaling-sensitive [21] . In addition to the Harris detector-based feature detection, Bas et al. [2] proposed a watermark embedding scheme based on decomposing an image into several meshes, each of which is formed from three detected feature points and is embedded with a watermark that is warped from a right-angles isosceles triangle 1 of size 64 64 to match the mesh's shape in the spatial domain. In the extraction process, each mesh in the spatial domain is warped to be normalized mesh from which a watermark is extracted to correlate with the original watermark. Although their method seems to provide a certain degree of robustness, thorough robustness evaluation through a standard benchmark (e.g., Stirmark [26] and , [27] ) is a lack and resistance to estimation attacks [15] that are particularly important for multiple watermark embedding approaches is also not discussed. In [33] , Mexican-Hat wavelet filtering was used for feature point extraction. Mexican-Hat wavelet filtering was implemented in the frequency domain using fast Fourier transform (FFT). Although one-dimensional (1-D) FFT is widely used to implement two-dimensional (2-D) FFT in order to improve computational efficiency, this implementation may lead to another severe problem; i.e., the input coefficient of 1-D FFT is quite different from the rotated version such that different 1-D FFT filters will lead to different filtering results. This is mainly due to the fact that the asynchronization effect is propagated and coupled with the result of Mexican-Hat wavelet filtering. In [29] , the scale-space theory was applied for feature point extraction. Feature points were determined through automatic scale selection and local extreme detection. For a chosen feature point, a circular disk is formed and used for embedding in the Fourier domain. However, there are two major drawbacks in [29] : 1) the embedding unit is a circular disk, which inherently limits the achievable robustness against geometric attacks that preserve the aspect ratio (this was also noted by the authors) and 2) since embedding is conducted in the magnitude component of the Fourier domain, as noted in the above discussions of the first category of methods, resistance to removal attacks is limited (this will be seen later in the comparison of experimental results).
After surveying the existing watermarking methods that provide a certain degree of robustness against geometric distortions, we have observed that 1) the methods in the first category are restricted to be affine invariant; 2) the pilot signals that are employed in the methods in the second category for the recovery of geometric parameters are easily removed; and 3) robust extraction of feature points plays a key role in the methods in the third category. In particular, we find that Voloshynovskiy et al.s scheme [35] was thoroughly verified by means of the standard benchmark, Stirmark [26] , [27] and possesses strong robustness. Thus, we can treat Voloshynovskiy et al.'s scheme as a state-of-the-art, robust watermarking technology. However, as described previously, this method is vulnerable to collusion, so initially embedded watermarks can be removed and the ability to resist extensive geometric attacks can be lost. Furthermore, we are aware of a recent paper [20] in which Manuel et al. exhaustively analyzed pilot-based synchronization algorithms and confirmed that pilot signals are easy to destroy. As a consequence, we do not adopt the paradigm of pilot-based watermarking even though it exhibits promising robustness against geometric attacks. Since the purpose of this paper is to propose an image watermarking scheme that can resist extensive geometric attacks and the watermark estimation attacks [15] simultaneously, we adopt feature-based watermarking based on the possibility [19] that the robustness of feature point extraction can be enhanced. Moreover, in our companion paper [15] , we proposed a block-based content-dependent watermarking scheme that combines our content-dependent watermark with the approach in [35] to tolerate the watermark estimation attacks. We also provided statistical analysis for the anti-disclosure content-dependent watermark to show its ability in resisting WEAs. However, the preset periodical regularity of a watermark pattern is destroyed, thus, resistance to geometric distortions is lost because the content-dependent watermarks resulting from all the image blocks are dissimilar. In order to further address this issue, we investigate mesh-based instead of block-based watermarking in this paper.
In this paper, we propose to use the Gaussian kernel as the preprocessing filter to stabilize the feature points. The Gaussian kernel is a circular and symmetric filter in that all the neighboring information of a pixel can be equally used to filtering, leading to geometric-invariant filtering. In order to resist watermark-estimation attacks, image hashing [19] is further extracted and combined with hidden watermarks to generate the media hash-based content-dependent watermark (CDW) [15] . CDW is able to resist the watermark estimation attacks because even though pirates can estimate watermarks from meshes, they still cannot be successfully colluded to generate an even more correct watermark that is to be removed. We also study how meshbased watermarking can be achieved without causing perceptual quality degradation. In addition to robustness, due to the unique characteristic of multiple mesh-based watermark embedding, we propose a false positive-oriented watermark detection mechanism to indicate the presence/absence of a watermark. We investigate how to determine the existence of a watermark in a mesh and in an image, respectively. In order to demonstrate the performance of our method in improving robustness, the standard benchmark, Stirmark, and watermark estimation attacks (including the collusion and copy attacks) were used to perform a thorough evaluation.
The proposed method follows the framework of [2] in that a watermark is embedded and extracted from an image unitmesh. However, there are a number of significant contributions that our paper describes. First, we investigate some important issues in Section II to improve the robustness. In particular, the common weakness of existing multiple watermark embedding approaches that are fragile against watermark estimation attacks [15] has been solved. Second, we find from [2] that the watermark signal is warped from the normalized domain to the spatial domain for embedding, while the extraction process is operated in the normalized domain. However, this asymmetric embedding and extraction paradigm cannot be used to achieve the goal of anti-estimations. This is because a pair of a watermark and a media hash is needed to be integrated to form a content-dependent watermark, as will be described in Section II-B, and the lengths of all media hashes must be kept the same. In this situation, the watermark embedding and extraction processes of our method are both performed in the normalized domain, as will be described in Section III. In addition, the modified coefficients in the normalized domain are warped to the spatial domain to accomplish embedding. Third, in Section IV, we develop a false positive-oriented watermark detection mechanism so that a reliable detection can be accomplished, and the tradeoff between correct detection and false detection can be more successfully guaranteed. Fourth, extensive experimental results together with robustness comparisons with other feature-based methods are given in Section V to verify the excellent performance of our scheme. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. ROBUST FEATURE EXTRACTION AND MEDIA HASH-BASED
CONTENT-DEPENDENT WATERMARK Two issues concerning the proposed watermarking method, robust feature extraction and media hash-based content-dependent watermark, will be discussed in this section. They play key roles in achieving the desired goal.
A. Robust Feature Extraction
Since our watermarking method is mesh-based, feature point extraction needs to be robust enough to approximately tolerate common filtering, compression, and geometric attacks for robust mesh generation. In our method, Gaussian kernel filtering, local maximum determination, and scale determination are integrated for designing a robust feature point extraction algorithm.
1) Gaussian Kernel Filtering:
Gaussian kernel filtering is a special case of scale-space filtering. In scale-space filtering, an image is filtered by several filters of different sizes to generate multiple frequency responses. In some applications, the filter size can be adaptive to different affine transformation environments. But in digital watermarking, we only select a fixed filter size to generate one level scale-space for watermark embedding. This benefits our watermark detection scheme in that only a small set of filters is required to achieve blind detection (as will be described in Section III-B). Let be a cover image, and let the Gaussian kernel be defined as where is the standard deviation. The convolution of the Gaussian kernel and the cover image is defined as Because the Gaussian kernel is isotropic and circular in shape, the resultant filtering response is rotation invariant [21] , [38] , which is beneficial for obtaining geometric-invariant feature points. In order to show the desired rotation insensitivity, we will illustrate an example in Fig. 2 to compare the feature point extractors presented here and [2] .
Let the Gaussian kernel be represented with at least times of standard deviation, which is described as a 2-D filter of size . For a Gaussian distribution, the probabilities [7] within one, two, and three standard deviations of its mean are about 68%, 95%, and 99.7%, respectively. Since three standard deviations of mean can sufficiently represent the energy of a Gaussian distribution, is adopted here.
2) Local Maximum Determination:
The local maximum determination process is operated in the Gaussian kernel filtered signal for feature point extraction. First, a maximum filter of size 3 3 is applied to and is expressed as (1) where denotes the 8-neighborhood of . Next, the set of feature points is determined as (2) which means that a feature point at satisfies that the filtering responses, and , are equal. In addition, the set of feature points, , is used to form a set of meshes by means of the Delaunay tessellation. In this paper, each mesh is a basic unit used for watermark embedding and extraction.
3) How Can We Choose ?: When the Gaussian kernel is used as the feature point detector, it is important to determine how many 's have to be used. If a larger is used, lower frequency (corresponding to larger scale) information tends to be revealed. On the other hand, high frequency (smaller scale) information can be detected when a smaller is used. Therefore, which should be used is an important issue. The selection of 's is also related to the ability to deal with geometric attacks because if the 's do not properly match the characteristics of geometrically attacked images, then the feature points will not be correctly detected.
These problems can be dealt with by observing the number of feature points across different 's (ranging from 2 to 5) for different image sizes (up to 512 512), as shown in Table I . Since at least three points are required to form a mesh, we need to choose 's that can produce at least three feature points. Let be the largest value that cannot generate at least three feature points. In addition, the number of feature points cannot be so large as to yield small meshes such that a watermark cannot be completely embedded. According to Table I , the value of that can be effective for watermark embedding is set to ( 1), which is defined as a detection scale. For example, for a 512 512 image, is adopted.
B. Content-Dependent Watermark
Some researchers [2] , [29] , [33] , [35] have proposed inserting multiple redundant watermarks into an image in the hope that this will suffice to maintain resistance to geometric distortions as long as at least one watermark exists. The common framework is that certain types of image units, such as blocks [35] , meshes [2] , or disks [29] , [33] , are extracted as carriers for embedding. With this unique characteristic, we propose to treat each image unit in an image like a frame in a video; in this way, collusion attacks can be equally applied to those image watermarking methods that employ a multiple redundant watermark embedding strategy. Therefore, we argue that once the hidden watermarks are successfully estimated by means of a collusion attack, the ability to resist geometric distortions become weaker such that the false negative problem occurs. Of particular interest is the possible quality improvement of attacked media data that can be achieved by means of collusion attack. In addition, copy attack can also efficiently defeat a watermarking system by creating ambiguity problems. Since the common operation involving in both collusion and copy attacks is watermark estimation, they are called WEAs [15] .
To withstand watermark-estimation attack, the key is to make the embedded watermarks different so that the hidden watermark cannot be approximately estimated by means of collusion. To this end, we propose to embed a media hash-based CDW, which is composed of a watermark and a media hash. Our analyses [15] show that CDW is able to resist both copy and collusion attacks. Here, the block-based content-dependent watermark [15] is introduced. Each block of size is divided into subblocks of size , and a block-pair relation is created by means of a secret key (the key is the same as that used to generate the watermark). Before hash generation, all subblocks are DCT transformed. For a pair of blocks, a hash bit, defined as the magnitude relationship between two AC coefficients, is represented as (3) where is a hash bit in a hash sequence , and and are two AC coefficients at positions and in blocks and , respectively. Given a pair consisting of hash and watermark , a media hash-based contentdependent watermark can be generated as (4) where is a shuffling function, which is basically application-dependent and will be used to control the combination of and . In our implementation, is first shuffled and the shuffled is used to disorder . Here, a transposition cipher [4] , [11] is used to change the position of a hash sequence with the aim of retaining robustness against bit errors (without error propagation). A more secure block cipher (e.g., the well-known DES algorithm) is not adopted due to its fragility to a single bit error. The signal is the watermark that we want to embed into a local region.
It should be noted that the robustness of media hash against attacks is crucial for to successfully resist attacks. Robust media hashing can also be applied for content authentication, copy detection, and identification [19] . On the other hand, we provided in [15] the statistical analysis of CDW to confirm its ability in resisting WEAs. Since these issues are beyond the theme of this paper, readers should refer [15] , [19] for more details.
III. PROPOSED WATERMARKING METHOD
In this section, the proposed media hash-based content-dependent watermarking scheme, which encompasses the watermark embedding process, watermark extraction process, and complexity analysis, is described.
A. Watermark Embedding
The watermark embedding process is outlined in Fig. 1 . In this paper, the hidden watermark is generated with a secret key and is a bipolar sequence of length , i.e., with each . 1) Mesh Generation: The first step in mesh generation is to filter a cover image using Gaussian filtering, as described in Section II, so that a set of feature points can be obtained. Next, the Delaunay tessellation is performed using to generate a set of meshes,
, where denotes the number of meshes extracted from a cover image. Each is a basic unit used for watermark embedding and extraction. Fig. 2 shows the comparisons of feature point extraction and mesh generation between our technique and [2] . By using our technique, Fig. 2(a) and (b) shows the detected feature points and the resultant meshes with respect to the original and rotated images. Similarly, Fig. 2(c) and (d) shows the results obtained from [2] . In Fig. 2 , the triangular meshes with white bold lines represent those meshes that can be found from both the original and rotated images. Obviously, the use of Gaussian kernel for feature point extraction achieves the goal of rotation insensitivity, which is especially desired in digital watermarking.
2) Content-Dependent Watermark Generation: The contentdependent watermark generation process, including: 1) mesh normalization; 2) media hash extraction; and 3) hash-based content-dependent watermark, will be described in the following. a) Mesh normalization: Before embedding is performed, each triangle mesh has to be normalized to obtain a canonical form. Here, a mesh normalization process is performed to affine transform each extracted mesh to obtain a rightangled isosceles triangle, which is called a normalized mesh, . The goals are not only to extract a fixed-length hash, but also to reduce the effect of image content shifting caused by the imperfect extraction of feature points. If the watermark signals are embedded in the spatial domain, the shifting problem, even with slice loss or pixel loss, may cause the watermark extraction process to fail. Therefore, the size of a normalized mesh needs to be properly determined. Our empirical research has shown that if a larger region is warped into a small region, which means that the warping process is a multiple-to-one pixel mapping, then one pixel in represents several pixels in . Under this circumstance, fewer pixels in will be affected by slice missing or shifting, which implies that a small normalized mesh of small size is beneficial for achieving robustness. In this study, the size of a normalized mesh is empirically found to be 48 48 for achieving a tradeoff between transparency and robustness (this choice will become clear in the next two paragraphs). Let denote the set of normalized meshes. b) Mesh-based hash extraction: A mesh-based media hash, , is extracted from each normalized mesh , as described in Section II-B. Since this paper investigates a mesh-based watermarking scheme, each normalized mesh prior to hash extraction needs to be transformed into a block. Here, each normalized mesh is flipped and then the flipped mesh is padded with the original version to form a block. If we set and , then the length of a hash sequence is 64. c) Media hash-based content-dependent watermark: In this paper, the watermark length is set to be 128 bits. Although the length of the media hash is 64 bits, by repeating it two times, a media hash of 128 bits can be generated. Then, each media hash and watermark are combined (4) to generate the content-dependent watermarks, i.e.,
. Although only one watermark is embedded for a cover image, the principle behind CDW leads to different signals embedded in different meshes.
3) Arrangement of Watermark Bits for Embedding: Since the length of a content-dependent watermark is 128 and the size of a normalized mesh is , we propose to repeatedly embed the watermark to enhance robustness, as shown in Fig. 3 . It is not hard to see that the time of repetition is . Let , where each element of is repeated nine times to form . This repeated embedding is very important for achieving better robustness, in particular when the mesh is (slightly) perturbed because its constituent feature points are not exactly the same as the ones detected in the embedding process. In other words, the feature extraction error and other numerical errors such as interpolation errors and rounding errors will affect the watermark detection performance. In order to deal efficiently with these problems, the repeated embedding of a watermark bit is performed [6] , [15] , [16] , [28] . Recall that in [29] the authors proposed to deal with this problem through locally searching (75 times) for the possibly correct feature point in the neighborhood of the detected point.
In summary, it can be observed that the watermark's length, the hash's length, and the normalized mesh's size are all designed in a sophisticated way to satisfy the embedding purpose so that robustness can be better achieved.
4) Mesh-Based Embedding:
In order to maintain transparency after performing watermarking, we adopt the noise visibility function (NVF) [34] , which is an image-dependent visual model. Content-adaptive watermark embedding is designed to insert watermarks into the cover image to form a stego image as follows: (5) where and denote the watermark strength, and is an element of a bipolar watermark signal. In [34] , the authors proposed to set to 3 for most real-world and computer-generated images. As for , it can be adjusted to keep the peak signal-tonoise ratio (PSNR) higher than a certain value. In our method, is adopted, and is adjusted to keep the PSNRs all at about 38 dB. Therefore, in our watermarking scheme, the watermark embedding process can be designed as (6) where denotes the th watermark element of , which is embedded in . Once the watermarked normalized mesh is obtained, the inverse normalization process is used to yield a watermarked mesh. Although "direct inverse normalization" is intuitive, transparency may be degraded because blocking effects are caused by the one-to-multiple pixel mapping. To deal with this problem, the difference between and , i.e., the second term on the right-hand side of (6), which is caused by watermarking in the normalized domain, is inversely normalized to yield the difference in the spatial domain. Hence, the watermarked mesh in the spatial domain can be obtained as (7) Based on (7), the original high-frequency components of can be preserved to maintain transparency. Finally, by integrating all watermarked meshes, we can obtain the stego image.
In order to illustrate the advantage of our embedding method (7) over inverse normalization (6) , an example is shown in Fig. 4 for visual comparison. Fig. 4(a) shows a stego Lena image that is generated through inverse normalization of watermarked meshes. Many interpolation errors and blocky effects can be observed. On the other hand, if the embedded signal in the normalized domain is transformed back to the spatial domain and then added to the original image, then as Fig. 4(b) shows, the visual quality is not perceptually degraded. 
B. Watermark Extraction
The process of determining the existence of a watermark is depicted in Fig. 5 . Basically, the watermark extraction process is the inverse process of watermark embedding.
1) Scale Matching Process:
In the watermark extraction end, the first step is to determine 's that will be used for filtering (Section II-A). Initially, as determined in the embedding end can be used; however, due to possible modifications of the stego image, a single value, , cannot be guaranteed to match the characteristics of the encountered attacked images. In order to tolerate varied attacks, in addition to , other 's may be needed. Some scenarios that will change the size of an image are described in the following to prove the need for several 's. If the size of a stego image is changed due to cropping (e.g., rotation cropping), then will fail to capture the characteristics of the cropped images because it cannot distinguish between scaling and cropping that lead to changes of the images' sizes. On the other hand, for a huge image, the watermark embedding and extraction processes should be operated in a tiling manner. The tile size selected in our proposed scheme is 512 512, which always sets to a fixed value 3, as described in Section II-A3. If the huge image is scaled down or up, then will be useless for capturing this change. Therefore, a scale matching process is proposed here to help us determine proper 's for filtering. First of all, we have to know the possible range of change of an image's size. Let us take the standard benchmark, Stirmark [26] , [27] as an example. For all non-geometric attacks, scaling, and other attacks that cause slight changes of an image's size, as determined in the embedded process can be used. For those attacks that have cropping effects (in Stirmark, rotation of 45 and cropping of more than 50% cause severer cropping effects), the size of an image could be quartered. Under these circumstances, instead of needs to be used. Here, let be written as . On the other hand, in the case of a huge image, it is not known whether the contents contained within a tile have been attacked or not. When we consider the modifications caused by scaling with factors ranging from 50% 200% (as provided in Stirmark), it is not hard to see that , , and are necessary to adapt to various tile sizes.
In summary, three filtering parameters, , , and , are required for filtering to extract the desired feature points under the constraint that Stirmark is considered for possible attacks. Of course, more filtering parameters can be used at the cost of more time spent to deal with attacks that cause severer effects. Here, let , , and , respectively, denote the sets of meshes extracted using , , and .
2) Media Hash-Based Content-Dependent Watermark Extraction:
The proposed content-dependent watermark extraction process is depicted in Fig. 6 . The normalization process is used to, respectively, transform the three sets of meshes, , , and , into corresponding sets of normalized meshes, , , and , from which three sets of media hashes, , , and , can be extracted. In this paper, Wiener filtering is used to blindly extract the hidden signal. Wiener filtering is considered to be an efficient method [8] , [15] , [35] because the watermark is usually a high-frequency signal. Let , , and be, respectively, extracted from , , and . Since the watermark bits are redundantly embedded, a bit is finally determined based on a majority selection rule. In this paper, each bit is repeatedly embedded into a mesh nine times. For an embedded bit, if most of its corresponding extracted bits are , then the extracted bit is finally determined to be . Let , , and be the extracted watermarks after the majority determination process is completely.
Next, three sets of extracted media hashes, , , and , corresponding to , , and , respectively, are separated from their corresponding watermarks, , , and , as follows:
Thus, we obtain the extracted watermark signals , , and .
C. Complexity of Our Method
The complexity of our watermarking algorithm, as depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 6 , is actually dominated by mesh normalization because it involves the most operations among all the steps of our method. More specifically, the number of arithmetic operations for pixel transformation during mesh normalization is constant and is proportional to the number of pixels in a mesh. Since the total number of pixels in all meshes that are required to execute normalization is approximately equal to the size of an image, as a result, it can be concluded that the time complexity of mesh normalization is proportional to image's size. Basically, the complexity of mesh normalization during embedding in our method and Bas et al.'s method [2] is the same, but our execution time is twice of theirs (see the explanations in the last paragraph of Section I, and Section III-A). As for the watermark extraction process, it is basically the inverse process of watermark embedding and, thus, both possess the same time complexity. However, in order to deal with scaling, as described in Section III-B1, the execution time of our watermark extraction process becomes three times longer than [2] .
IV. FALSE POSITIVE-ORIENTED DETERMINATION
OF THE EXISTENCE OF A WATERMARK In order to indicate the presence/absence of a watermark in an image, the first step is to determine whether a watermark exists in a mesh. For each (or , ) , the bit-error rate (BER) between and (or and , and ) is calculated. If the BER is smaller than a threshold , it is said that a watermark exists in a mesh. The threshold needs to be determined by considering the false positive factor because to claim the robustness of a watermarking system is meaningful only when the false positive probability is taken into consideration in measuring robustness. In this study, the bit-detection process is treated as an independent random Bernoulli trail with probability , which is the probability that the bit ( 1 or 1) will occur, and is considered to always be 0.5 here. Theoretically, the probability of truly detecting a watermark in a mesh when holds can be represented as (11) Equation (11) also specifies the probability that a watermark can be found in a mesh that has not, in fact, been watermarked. As a result, determining the threshold is important. In order to reasonably determine , in (11) should be consistent with practical results. To this end, the BERs obtained from extensive "sequence-pair" comparisons were collected. A sequence-pair is composed of the watermark known by the owner and a signal that is extracted from one of the meshes in a random image. First of all, every unwatermarked image chosen from the Corel image database was applied as the input to our watermark detection process, as described in Section III-B. For each image, a set of BERs could be obtained after sequence-pair comparisons were performed. After testing all 20 000 images in the Corel image database, we obtained the BER distribution and its cumulative distribution shown in Fig. 7 . Based on this information, if is chosen to be 0.375, then in (11) is calculated to be 0.003, which is very close to the cumulative distribution function , , of the BER distribution measured using the Corel image database. Consequently, it can be concluded that is a reasonable choice. On the other hand, there are three vertexes in each . However, some geometric attacks may change the relationship between the three vertexes, which is crucial for mesh normalization. In order to deal with this problem, we do not merely detect a watermark from one possible normalized mesh; instead, possible normalized meshes are all fed into the watermark extraction process. Thus, the probability of detecting a watermark in a mesh, , can be derived as (12) which is still numerically close to , as derived in (11) . On the other hand, the probability of failing to detect a watermark is derived as . So far, we have discussed how one can determine the existence of a watermark in a mesh. Now, we will proceed to explain how one can determine the existence of a watermark in an image by incorporating the mesh-based detection results. Recall that is the number of meshes in an image (no matter whether it is attacked or not). Let be the number of meshes found to have been watermarked, as described in the above paragraphs. The probability of determining that a suspect image was watermarked before is derived as (13) based on the constraint that out of a total of meshes are regarded to having been watermarked. In fact, (13) also reveals the probability that a random image will be "wrongly" determined as having been watermarked. Furthermore, this also implies that different attacks lead to different 's; i.e., a more challenging attack will generate a higher false positive probability.
In order to claim the presence of a watermark with strong confidence (without causing a non-negligible false positive), should be low. On the other hand, should be large to achieve robustness. Here, a reasonable threshold, , is required to satisfy the tradeoff between robustness and false positive. Again, the Corel image database was adopted here to derive . Every unwatermarked image chosen from the Corel image database was applied as the input to our watermark detection process. For each image, one was obtained based on (13) . By integrating all the 's, the cumulative distribution function showed that and . Thus as a guideline, it is helpful to set the threshold to according to the information obtained from the Corel image database. It should be noted that although meshes are adopted in this paper, similar results can be obtained using other types of image units, such as blocks or disks.
It should be noted that since three 's are employed for watermark detection, three 's are generated. The smallest value will be chosen as the final (corresponding to the largest ).
A. Comparison With Other Methods
In this section, some recent papers that have proposed featurebased watermarking methods will be discussed. False positive probability analysis was also conducted in [29] and [33] , which proposed to embed watermarks into disks that are extracted from an image. However, the existence of a watermark was not finally determined by taking the derived false positive probability into consideration. On the contrary, these authors only indicate the number of disks (out of the number of total disks) that can be found to contain the hidden watermark . TABLE II  NONGEOMETRIC ATTACKS FOR BABOON   TABLE III  NONGEOMETRIC ATTACKS FOR LENA   TABLE IV  NONGEOMETRIC ATTACKS FOR PEPPER In [29, eq. (23) ], the false positive probability for one image was defined as follows: (14) where the watermark is detected from at least disks and is the number of disks in an image that are available for watermarking. In their method, .
In [33] , the false positive probability derived from each disk was defined in (5) of their paper as follows: (15) where , , , and . When the parameters are substituted into (15), is obtained. On the other hand, the false positive probability derived from an image is defined in [33, eq. (6)] as (16) where is total number of disks in an image, and at least disks are detected as "successful."
As surveyed above, the false positive probabilities of [29] , [33] and ours are all calculated based on the Binomial distribution, as shown in (14), (16) , and (13), respectively. However, the major difference between them is the probability of determining whether an embedding unit (either a mesh or disk) has been watermarked or not, which is in Seo and Yoo's method [29] , in Tang and Hang's method [33] , and in our method. In this study, robustness comparisons among our method, Seo and Yoo's method [29] , and Tang and Hang's method [33] were conducted by taking the derived false positive probabilities into consideration. The results will be reported in the next section.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to thoroughly verify the robustness of the proposed scheme, the standard benchmark, Stirmark 3.1 [26] , [27] , and the WEAs [15] were adopted. Three standard images, Baboon, Lena, and Pepper, were used here as cover images, and the size of each one was 512 512. After mesh-based watermark embedding was performed, the PSNR values between the cover image and its stego image for Baboon, Lena, and Pepper were 36.06, 38.44, and 38.32 dB, respectively. No perceptual differences could be observed. Although the PSNR of stego Baboon was smaller than 38 dB, it was still hard to find any quality degradation because the Baboon image was rather noisy. As described previously, two thresholds, and , were adopted in our method. In this section, experimental results will be demonstrated with respect to resistance to removal (non-geometric) attacks, resistance to geometric attacks, and resistance to watermark-estimation attacks. The reasons that may lead to the obtained results will also be identified.
In order to demonstrate the superiority of our method, we compared it with other feature-based watermarking methods [2] , [29] [33] . In digital watermarking, it has been recognized that robustness is meaningful only if false positives are taken into consideration. Although false positive analyses were conducted in [29] , [33] the detection results did not show the impact of this factor, so the reported results are not fully convincing. Therefore, in this study the false positive probability was derived using (14) for the method in [29] and (16) for the method in [33] . To avoid tedious comparisons, the parameters that could produce better results in [29] , [33] were adopted here. In [29] , the authors declared that when and are used, is obtained according to (14) . The number of disks, , detected to contain a watermark and the number of total disks, , in (14) are denoted in the following tables as and , respectively. was adopted in [29] . In [33] , , , , and were used, leading to . 2 The number of disks, , found to contain watermarks and the number of total disks, , in (16) are denoted in the following tables as and , respectively. " " in the following tables denotes "the number of detected watermarked meshes(disks)/the number of total meshes(disks)." The experimental comparisons in terms of resistance to Stirmark attacks between our approach and [29] , [33] will be reported in Sections V-A and V-B, respectively.
On the other hand, since Bas et al.'s scheme [2] was not evaluated using Stirmark, we implement their approach for the purpose of comparison. We will discuss the robustness comparisons in Section V-C.
Finally, the results about the resistance of our proposed hashdependent watermarking to estimation attacks will be reported in Section V-D.
A. Resistance to Nongeometric Attacks
The watermark detection results with respect to nongeometric attacks are shown in Tables II-IV for the three standard images, respectively. In Table II , the method in [29] can only survive FMLR and color reduce attacks, while our method and that in [33] can tolerate JPEG compression up to a quality factor of 40%. Furthermore, only our method can survive the Sharpening attack. As shown in Table III , our method can survive almost all attacks except for JPEG10 and FMLR attacks, so it is more robust than the other two. A similar result can also be found in Table IV . On a whole, our method when compared with those in [29] , [33] can survive most of the nongeometric attacks of Stirmark 3.1. We also note that it is challenging to extract robust feature points from complex images such as Baboon. Thus, the overall performance with respect to Baboon is not as robust as that for other smoothing images. This phenomenon was observed in [2] , [29] , and [33] as well as in our study.
B. Resistance to Geometric Attacks
The results of comparisons of resistance to geometric distortions are shown in Tables V-VII . Basically, it can be observed that our method and that in [29] provide that is sufficiently [2] ; SCHEME 3: PROPOSED FEATURE EXTRACTOR + SYMMETRIC WATERMARKING PARADIGM lower than that in [33] for line removal, cropping attacks, and general linear transformations. Our method also consistently provides much lower 's for shearing and random bending attacks. For other attacks, our method was thoroughly evaluated and found to provide low 's, while [29] , [33] did not. This is particularly obvious for resistance to change of the aspect ratio and large degree of shearing (e.g., Shearing
) because the circular disk adopted in [29] , [33] could not accommodate such an attack. In addition, for those attacks involving rotations (e.g., shearing, rotation), the method [33] basically generates poor results since the used filtering is rotation-sensitive. In order to better adapt to varied attacks, a rotation-invariant filtering technique together with a triangular mesh-based watermarking scheme are adopted in this study.
C. Comparisons With Bas et al.'s Scheme [2]
Experimental comparisons were conducted based on two scenarios. In the first scenario, the only difference is that the feature point extractors used in our approach and [2] are different, while the watermark size and the mesh size are the same, and the mesh-based watermarking paradigm [2] (called asymmetric embedding/detection process here) is adopted. Let our feature extractor+asymmetric embedding/detection be scheme 1 and Bas et al.'s feature extractor asymmetric embedding/detection be scheme 2. The goal is to demonstrate the geometric resilience of the proposed feature point extractor by comparing schemes 1 and 2. The second scenario is similar to the first scenario. The only difference is that the watermark embedding/detection process is different, i.e., the so-called symmetric watermarking paradigm proposed here and the asymmetric watermarking paradigm used in [2] are compared. Let our feature extractor symmetric embedding/detection be scheme 3. In both scenarios, the PSNR values of stego images generated from our approach and [2] were controlled to approximately the same. Again, the standard benchmark, Stirmark, was used for robustness evaluation.
The detection results are measured in terms of the proposed false positive probability (13) and are summarized in Table VIII-XIII. In the first scenario, we observe that the 's obtained from scheme 1 are significantly smaller than those from scheme 2 except for very few exceptions, which implies that the proposed geometric-invariant feature extractor is rather helpful in achieving resistance to geometric attacks. In the second scenario, we also observe that the detection results obtained from the two different watermarking paradigms (schemes 2 and 3) are comparable. This means that both the symmetric watermark paradigm (proposed here) and asymmetric watermarking paradigm (used in [2] ) equally contribute to robustness. However, as described previously, the proposed symmetric watermarking embedding and detection processes are required to achieve anti-estimation attacks if the hash-dependent watermarks are embedded. Overall, through experimental comparisons we can confirm that our method 
D. Resistance to Watermark-Estimation Attacks (WEAs)
The collusion attack and copy attack were used to verify the resistance achieved by our method to WEAs [15] . Table XIV and XV show the results of resisting collusion attack for CDW embedding and non-CDW embedding, respectively. After a collusion attack was performed, the number of detected meshes as shown in Table XV was smaller than that shown in Table XIV , which implies that our proposed scheme with CDW embedding efficiently defends against the collusion attack. It should also be noted that mesh-based collusion does not increase the PSNRs of colluded images as block-based collusion does [15] . This may be due to the fact that the interpolation errors involving in mesh warping neutralize the expected PSNR improvement of collusion. Table XVI and XVII show the results of resisting copy attack for CDW embedding and non-CDW embedding, respectively. After a copy attack was performed, the number of detected meshes as shown in Table XVII was larger than that shown in Table XVI , which implies our proposed scheme with CDW embedding efficiently defends against the copy attack. However, the content-independent watermarking methods [2] , [29] , [33] cannot survive WEAs [15] .
To summarize, extensive experiment results verify that our method indeed outperforms all the other feature-based watermarking methods.
E. Discussions
In this section, we shall discuss the impact of each step in our method on the detection results and identify which step mostly affects the overall performance. As described previously in Section III, in addition to media hashing, feature point extraction and denoising-based blind detection are recognized as two main factors that may affect the performance of our method. Since the robustness of our media hashing has been verified in [19] , it is not discussed here again. According to the experimental results shown in the above tables, it is important to know how many meshes of a stego image, under the absence of attacks, can be detected to contain watermarks. Two experiments were performed based on the conditions that (i) the feature points and media hashes extracted from the original image are directly applied to the stego image, which means that feature point extraction is perfect and we are only interested in understanding the effect of Wiener filtering and (ii) all the processes are the same as those described in Section III, which means that by comparing the results obtained from conditions (i) and (ii), we can understand the effect of feature point extraction (and media hashing). The results of these two experiments are depicted in Table XVIII .
As we can see from Table XVIII that when condition (i) is considered, denoising-based blind detection slightly affects the detection results. For example, the number, , of total meshes in Baboon is 103 and the number of meshes, , detected to contain watermarks is 67. The similar results can also be found in Lena and Pepper. However, when condition (ii) is considered, for each stego image, when compared with the results obtained in condition (i), is dramatically reduced. This obviously implies that the correctness of extracted points plays a major role in the performance of our watermarking method. More specifically, it can be observed from Table XVIII that the average displacements (in pixels) of feature points illustrate the obtained detection results. As a consequence, we can conclude that the stability of feature point extraction mainly affects the overall performance of our watermarking method. This conclusion is also consistent with the robustness verifications described in the above subsections that resistance to attacked Baboon images is apparently inferior to resistance to other smoother images.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Although multiple watermarks can be embedded into an image to provide resistance to geometric distortions, we found in our companion study [15] that they are, unfortunately, vulnerable to watermark estimation attacks (including collusion and copy attacks) such that the desired geometric invariance is lost. In view of this fact, a mesh-based content-dependent image watermarking method that can resist extensive geometric attacks and watermark estimation attacks simultaneously has been proposed here. There are three major contributions of our method. First, robust mesh extraction is designed to enhance the feasibility of feature-based watermarking methods. Second, a media hash-based content-dependent watermark that is composed of a watermark and a hash is used to resist watermarking-estimation attack. Third, a false positive-oriented watermark detection mechanism is applied to determine the existence of a watermark so as to achieve a tradeoff between correct detection and false detection. The performance of our scheme in enhancing robustness has been thoroughly verified using the standard benchmark, Stirmark, and watermark estimation attacks.
However, the major weakness of our method is its high complexity since most of the time is spent on mesh warping, which makes the method in its current state unsuitable for real-time applications. By keeping the achievable robustness, reducing the complexity of our method deserves further researching. In addition, as described in Section V-E, enhancing the stability of feature point extraction can further improve the overall performance of the proposed method. Finally, the important issue of security against protocol attacks based on the proposed method was also investigated. Due to limits of space, the results were reported elsewhere [18] .
